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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Plaintiff Cordelia Lear (Cordelia) filed an initial action in the
United States District Court for the District of New Union asserting an uncompensated takings claim against the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS or the Government) and Brittain County (the
County), and challenging the constitutionality of applying Congress’ Commerce powers under the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2012) (ESA). R. at 4.1 The district court had
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) because the issues
arose “under the Constitution.” This action is an appeal from a
final decision and judgment issued by the District Court on June
1, 2016 awarding Plaintiff damages for an uncompensated taking,
dismissing the constitutional challenge, and disposing of all parties’ other claims. R. at 1, 12. Final decisions from the District
Court are appropriately under the jurisdiction of this Court for review. 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

Whether Congress’s Commerce power extends through the
ESA to regulate takes of a purely intrastate species that has
no substantial effect on interstate commerce.

II.

Whether Cordelia’s takings claim is ripe for review without
applying for an ITP when the cost for the permit application
alone would exceed the total property value.

III.

Whether a takings analysis of the Cordelia Lot should include the entirety of Lear Island as the relevant parcel, despite the vesting of Plaintiff’s distinct fee simple absolute
interest in the ten-acre lot.

IV.

Whether a categorical takings claim based on deprivation
of economically beneficial use is prevented by the possibility

1. Citations with “R. at __” refer to the Record of the Final Problem, revised
on November 7, 2016.
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of the natural destruction of the Karner Blue’s habitat in
ten years.
V.

Whether a takings claim based on no remaining economically beneficial use is precluded by an offer to pay an annual
rent totaling less than the cost of yearly property tax on the
Cordelia Lot.

VI.

Whether public trust principles inhere in Cordelia’s title so
as to prevent her takings claim resulting from the denial of
a county wetlands permit.

VII.

Whether FWS or the County can avoid joint liability for a
takings claim when the Cordelia Lot is left with no economically beneficial use as a result of the combined regulations.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Fifth Amendment upholds important values of fairness
and justice by protecting private landowners from bearing an individual burden when government intrudes on their property. The
type of government intrusion demanding just compensation was
traditionally physical occupation, regardless of how insignificant,
and has expanded to include both eminent domain powers and regulatory powers. Where an individual property has been subjected
to regulation that goes too far, leaving a property with no economically beneficial use, an aggrieved party may bring an action in
court demanding just compensation. Here, Cordelia Lear brought
an action seeking just compensation for the regulatory deprivation
of any development of her property – a violation of the Fifth
Amendment that offends public notions of fairness and requires
just compensation.
Regulatory takings doctrine has undergone significant transformation over the last century, however, courts have made clear
that private property rights are a well-protected bedrock of American law. FWS has asserted regulatory authority through a tenuous and improper application of the Commerce Clause as applied
to an isolated interstate population of Karner Blue butterflies on
Lear Island. The result when combined with the Brittain County
Wetlands Law completely deprives Cordelia of all economically
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beneficial use of her land. FWS and Brittain County, by denying
joint liability, seek to obstruct Cordelia Lear’s Fifth Amendment
right to just compensation for the actual loss suffered as a result of
the combined regulations.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Located in Brittain County in the State of New Union, Lear
Island is a 1,000-acre island near the edge of Lake Union, a large
interstate lake. R. at 4. In 1803, while present-day New Union
was still a part of the Northwest Territory, Congress granted Lear
Island and its surrounding submerged lands within 300 feet of the
shoreline (the Grant) to Cornelius Lear in fee simple absolute. R.
at 4, 5. By 1965, King James Lear had inherited the fee simple
absolute interest in the entirety of Lear Island. R. at 4, 5.
In 1965, the Brittain Town Planning Board approved subdivision of the property into three lots, and determined that each lot
could develop at least one single-family residence. R. at 5. King
Lear deeded each of the three lots separately to his daughters, reserving a life estate for himself. Id. Cordelia Lear took possession
of her deeded property in 2005 when King Lear died. Id.
Lear Island contains the last remaining habitat of the New
Union subpopulation of Karner Blue Butterfly, a federally listed
endangered species. R. at 5. The FWS designated the Karner Blue
an endangered species in 1992, and concurrently designated the
Cordelia Lot as critical habitat. Id. Cordelia asserts claims
against FWS and Brittan County for an uncompensated taking of
her property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id.
The property that is the subject of this action (the Cordelia
Lot) comprises ten acres of the 1,000-acre Island, not including any
submerged lands. R. at 5, n.2. The Cordelia Lot consists of a 40foot by 1000-foot access strip and an open field comprised of nine
acres of uplands. Id. Fronting the lot is about one acre of emergent
cattail marsh in a cove that was historically open water and used
as a boat landing (the Cove). Id. The Cordelia Lot has been kept
open by annual mowing each October and is covered by wild blue
lupine flowers, essential for the survival of the Karner Blue. Id.
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In 2012, Cordelia contacted the New Union FWS bureau to inquire if development of her property would require any permits due
to the presence of the Karner Blue. R. at 6. FWS advised her that
the entirety of the Cordelia lot was critical habitat, and “any disturbance” other than annual mowing “would constitute a take” in
violation of the ESA. Id. The FWS agent advised Cordelia that in
order to obtain an ITP under section 10 of the ESA, she would have
to develop a habitat conservation plan (HCP) and perform an environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy
Act. Id. The FWS further advised in their May 15, 2012 letter that
an HCP would only be approvable if she provided for contiguous
lupine habitat within a one-thousand-foot radius of the existing
fields, and if she committed to maintaining the remaining lupine
fields through annual mowing. Id. Cordelia does not own any surrounding contiguous land, and the neighboring owner has refused
any cooperation. Id. Preparation of an ITP, including the required
HCP and environmental assessment documents, would cost
$150,000. Id. The fair market value of the Cordelia Lot without
any restrictions that would prevent development of a single-family
home is $100,000. R. at 7.
Without annual mowing, the Karner Blue habitat could disappear naturally; a process that would take an estimated ten
years. R. at 7. The result would be extinction of the New Union
subpopulation of Karner Blues. Id. Cordelia developed an Alternative Development Proposal (ADP) that would not disturb the lupine fields. Id. In the ADP, Cordelia proposed filling one half-acre
of the marsh in the Cove to create a lupine-free building site, together with an access causeway. Id.
No federal approval is required for the ADP because the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers has determined this portion of Lake Union to be “non-navigable” for purposes of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, and because construction of residential dwellings involving one half-acre or less are authorized by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers Nationwide Permit 29. R. at 7. Pursuant to the
County Wetlands Law, enacted in 1982, the ADP required a permit
to fill the cove marsh. Id. Cordelia duly filed a permit application
with the Brittain County Wetlands Board in August 2013. Id. In
December 2013, the County denied Cordelia’s permit application
on the grounds that permits to fill wetlands would only be granted
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for a water-dependent use, and that a residential home site was
not a water-dependent use. R. at 6.
There is no market in Brittain County for a parcel like the
Cordelia lot for recreational use without the right to develop a residence on the property, nor does the Cordelia Lot have any market
as agricultural or timber land. R. at 7. Property taxes on the Cordelia Lot are $1,500 annually. Id. The Brittain County Butterfly
Society has offered to pay Cordelia $1000 annually to conduct butterfly viewings which she declined. R. at 7.
In February 2014, Cordelia filed an action in the United States
District Court for the District of New Union, seeking a declaration
that the ESA was an unconstitutional exercise of congressional legislative power when applied to a wholly intrastate population, or
alternatively, just compensation from both the County and FWS
because the regulations together restrict all economically beneficial use of the land. Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The possible standards of review for a district court opinion
are de novo, clear error, or abuse of discretion. See Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard applied depends on the context of the issues on appeal. United States v.
Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000). De novo is the
appropriate standard for issues predominantly involving interpretation of law, while factual determinations by the District Court
must be upheld absent clear error. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). Furthermore, the clear error standard applies to “findings based on
documentary evidence” in addition to oral testimony. Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 500 (1984) (citing
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 541
(1948)).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
FWS regulation of the Cordelia Lot under the ESA is an overreach of the Commerce Clause, which allows federal regulation of
commerce between states. When Congress asserts authority over
an activity using the Commerce Clause, that activity must be economic in nature and have a sufficient effect on interstate commerce. Unlike ESA cases that have upheld Commerce Clause authority, the present case is entirely absent of any interstate
activity. Not even tenuous connections such as those of tourism or
scientific research will take place on the private land of Cordelia
Lear. The regulation here goes beyond a mere prohibition on development to encompass “any disturbance” of the Karner Blue, effectively disallowing any use or enjoyment of the lot. Therefore,
regulating development on the Cordelia Lot through the Commerce Clause is an improper extension of federal authority.
As a threshold matter, the takings claim currently before this
Court is ripe for review. The actions of FWS and the County are
final, and the absence of any permissible use of the property is
known to a reasonable degree of certainty. Additionally, the
$150,000 cost of pursuing an unattainable ITP is more than the
value of the Cordelia Lot itself. Requiring Cordelia to follow such
strict formality before judicial review becomes available constitutes an undue burden, and is not a necessary step when faced with
administrative futility. The Court should find this issue ripe for
review because the Supreme Court has specifically identified futility as an exemption to a final decision.
The ten-acre Cordelia Lot is the relevant parcel for a regulatory takings analysis. King James Lear deeded his fee simple interest in the Lot to Cordelia in 1965, and she was vested with full
possession and ownership of the Lot in fee simple absolute when
King Lear passed away in 2005. The Cordelia Lot is now a distinct
and separate estate from the neighboring lots. As such, the tenacre lot is the “denominator,” or baseline of value in the takings
analysis “ratio,” whereby the loss of beneficial use of the property
is the “numerator.” Because the severance of the Lear Island Parcels was legal and final rather than “conceptual,” there is no basis
for the assertion that the Lear Island lots should be considered as
a single parcel.

7
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The regulations preventing development of the Cordelia Lot
are permanent, and categorical treatment of the takings claim
should be upheld. Unlike the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
temporary building moratoria, the analysis of the present case does
not leave any future interest remaining in the parcel as a
whole. Categorical regulatory takings look only to the interest lost
at the time property use was restricted. Moreover, no regulatory
taking is truly “permanent” because regulations can always be
changed. It would be improper to rely on a hypothetical adjustment of the regulation’s current deprivation of all economic use of
the property, thus the Court should find a categorical taking occurred.
Additionally, Cordelia’s categorical takings claim is not precluded by the offer from the Britain County Butterfly Society. A
purported economic gain that is less than the expense of property
tax and actually results in a net loss is per se a non-economically
viable use. Furthermore, it is evident that even land so heavily
regulated as to have no remaining beneficial use still retains some
value. Government regulations cannot, within the confines of the
Fifth Amendment, eviscerate private land rights and leave behind
only a token value without paying compensation. This Court
should affirm Cordelia’s valid categorical takings claim based on a
complete loss of economically beneficial use.
Public trust principles do not inhere in Cordelia Lear’s rights
of ownership and use of the riparian lands fronting the Lot. In
1803, Lear Island was granted to Cordelia’s ancestor by the United
States Congress before the admission of the State of New Union. At that time, the U.S. Government had sovereign authority
over what was then the Northwest Territory. When Congress
granted the Island and its surrounding submerged lands to Cornelius Lear in fee simple absolute, the U.S. was divested of its sovereign title over the Grant, and therefore did not convey it to the
State upon admission to the Union. Thus, Brittain County has no
authority to regulate Cordelia’s riparian lands under a public trust
theory.
FWS and Brittain County should be held jointly liable for the
total deprivation of all economically beneficial use of the Cordelia
Lot. The Fifth Amendment prohibition on uncompensated taking
of property is extended to the States (and Counties) by the Fourteenth Amendment, rendering both FWS and the County generally
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liable for Fifth Amendment Takings Clause violations. Regulatory
takings analysis centers on the loss suffered by landowners, rather
than the benefits accrued or harms prevented by regulation. Because Cordelia was deprived of all economically beneficial use of
her property, a categorical taking has occurred, and requires just
compensation equal to the fair market value of the property. An
absence of Federal appellate case law either enforcing or barring
joint agency liability makes this an issue of first impression for a
Federal Circuit Court. This Court should avoid potentially injurious precedents and affirm Fifth Amendment protections against
uncompensated takings by finding FWS and Brittain County
jointly liable.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMMERCE POWER DOES NOT EXTEND
TO AN INTRASTATE SPECIES THAT DOES NOT
AFFECT INTERSTATE COMMERCE

The lower court erred when it found that the ESA is a valid
exercise of the Congress’ Commerce power, as applied to a wholly
intrastate population of an endangered butterfly. People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. United States FWS, 57 F. Supp.3d
1337, 1343 (D. Ut. 2014). FWS seeks to regulate activity that is
noneconomic in nature that has no effect on interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding
the Gun–Free School Zones Act unconstitutional in part because it
had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise); United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). FWSs
confirmation to Cordelia that “any disturbance” other than annual
mowing would constitute a take in violation of the ESA exceeds the
limits of federal power. R. at 6; See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton,
323 F.3d 1062, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rationalizing that the focus
is on the activity that the government seeks to regulate). By placing limitations on any disturbance, FWS seeks to regulate activity
with no effect on interstate commerce like that of “a hiker’s casual
walk in the woods.” See Rancho Viejo, LLC, 323 F.3d at 1077.
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The District court erroneously found that the relevant activity
being regulated is the underlying land development through construction of the proposed residence. The inclusion of the language
“any disturbance” indicates the impermissible extent of government reach. R. at 8; See GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. V. Norton,
362 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Rancho Viejo, LLC 323
F.3D at 1077. Furthermore, the regulation does not prohibit the
taking of the Karner Blue for any purpose involving tourism or scientific research. Gibbs v. Babbitt 214 F.3d 483, 493 (4th Cir. 2000).
Therefore, this court should reverse the lower court’s holding and
find that the ESA is not a valid exercise of Congress’ Commerce
Power as applied to the Karner Blue butterfly.
A. The Karner Blue Population is Completely
Confined to the Cordelia Lot, and an Extension of
the Commerce Clause is Unwarranted
The ESA prohibits the take of any endangered species. 16
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). By prohibiting the take of an entirely intrastate species, FWS is regulating noneconomic activities such as
land clearing and vegetation removal that do not involve interstate
commerce. R. 8. Congress has authority to regulate the use of interstate commerce, and protect the instrumentalities of, or persons
or things in, interstate commerce. People for Ethical Treatment of
Prop. Owners, 57 F.Supp.3d 1343. The regulated activity must be
economic in nature when relying on the substantial aggregate effects as the basis for regulation under the Commerce power. Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561; Morrison 529 U.S. at 617; Mississippi Commission
on Environmental Quality v. E.P.A., 790 F.3d 138, 182 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (holding ozone pollution has economic consequences on interstate commerce); Allied Local & Regional Manufacturers. Caucus v. U.S. E.P.A., 215 F.3d 61, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (regulating environmental hazards that have effects in more than one
state). The Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to regulate takes of a “purely intrastate species that has no substantial
effect on interstate commerce.” People for Ethical Treatment of
Prop. Owners, 57 F.Supp.3d at 1346.
There is a logical stopping point for the court’s rationale in upholding the constitutionality of the Commerce power. In Rancho
Viejo, the Chief Judge distinguishes large-scale construction of a
housing development that does affect interstate commerce from the
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“homeowner who moves dirt in order to landscape his property,”
explaining that although he “takes the toad, that does not affect
interstate commerce.” 323 F.3d at 1080 (Chief Judge Ginsburg,
concurring) (emphasis added). Without this limitation, “any kind
of activity[]” could be regulated by the government, “regardless [of]
whether that regulated activity ha[s] any connection with interstate commerce.” Id. Unlike large scale development projects, disturbance of the Cordelia Lot has no effect on interstate commerce. See id.
B. The Regulation is Not Necessary to Sustain Any
Economic Activity
Regulating the take of an endangered species under the Commerce Clause has been upheld when such regulation sustains interstate economic activity. Gibbs v. Babbitt 214 F.3d at 493. For
example, the Commerce Clause can be used to regulate the preservation of a species where scientists and tourists may seek out the
animal, thus traveling from other states and utilizing interstate
commerce channels. Id. The New Union subpopulation of the Karner Blue does not affect interstate commerce through any such activities, as they exist only on the private land of Cordelia. Id. at
494. Without such a link to economic activity, Congress’ Commerce
power is not valid. See id. at 493-95.
In the instant case, upholding of the commerce clause would
be a limitless application of federal protection. See GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. 362 F.3d at 292. Applying the commerce clause
here would “convert the ESA to an economic regulatory statute.”
Id. The effects of the Karner Blue butterfly on interstate commerce are too attenuated to pass constitutional muster. See id. at
292 (citing Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612).
II. THE TAKINGS CLAIM IS RIPE BECAUSE
FURTHER PURSUIT OF A PERMIT WOULD BE
FUTILE
The taking of Cordelia’s property occurred when FWS promulgated the rule designating her property as critical habitat, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (2012) (requiring that critical
habitat for an endangered species shall be designated concurrently
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with listing). 57 Fed. Reg. 59,236 (Dec. 14, 1992). The FWS confirmed this when they advised Cordelia that her “entire ten-acre
property” was critical habitat and that “any disturbance” would
constitute a take in violation of the ESA. R. at 6. The advisory
letter of May 15, 2012 constituted a constructive denial of an ITP,
and provided sufficient information concerning the prohibitive restrictions on the Cordelia Lot to constitute a final agency action. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001). Any further effort towards an already unattainable ITP would also be
unduly burdensome, therefore causing this claim to be ripe. See
Hage v. United States, 35 Fed.Cl. 147, 164 (1996); Robbins v.
United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 381, 387 (aff’d) (Fed. Cir. 1998).
A. Cordelia’s Claim is Ripe for Review Because the
Agency Action Constituted a Final Decision
Under the ripeness doctrine, courts examine (1) the hardship
the aggrieved party will suffer from withholding judicial review
and (2) the fitness of the issue for judicial decision. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). In the present case,
FWS and the County have acted through regulatory mechanisms
to deprive Cordelia all economic use of her property. This case is
ripe for review because the denial of development is determinative,
and without judicial intervention Cordelia will lose all economic
use of her land. See id.
A takings claim is ripe when an “agency charged with implementing the regulation has reached a final decision regarding their
application to the property at issue.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 607
(citing Williamson County Regional Planning Community v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)). A final decision does not occur until the responsible agency determines the
extent of permitted development on the land. MacDonald Sommer
& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986). Here, FWS confirmed the extent of the permitted development on the land with
the May 15, 2012 letter stating “any disturbance” other than the
annual mowing “would constitute a ‘take’” in violation of the
ESA. R. at 6.; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618-19. FWS explained the
extent of the regulation on the Cordelia Lot with finality, which
eliminates all beneficial use of the property. See id.
The court in Williamson Cty. establishes the two-part test for
ripeness. 473 U.S. at 186. The test requires that (1) a landowner
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obtain a final decision regarding the application of the challenged
regulations to his property and (2) utilizes any state procedures for
obtaining just compensation if they are available. Id. at 190-94. In
the present case, the second prong of the Williamson Cty. test is
inapplicable because the State of New Union does not have a just
compensation clause, nor does the State have a statute providing
for a procedure seeking just compensation. R. at 9, n. 5; see Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 194. The first prong was satisfied when
FWS effectively reached a final decision regarding the applicability
of the ESA to the Cordelia Lot, and provided Cordelia with conditions that were impossible to satisfy. R. at 9; see id.
In takings claims, the Williamson Cty. finality requirement
applies to decisions about how a plaintiff’s own land may be used.
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 739
(1997); see Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186. FWS advised Cordelia about conditions that made the ITP unattainable, and confirmed that its discretion was exhausted in regards to the use of
her land. R. at 9; Id. Therefore, further pursuit of an ITP is not
necessary and an application would be futile. See Suitum, 520 U.S.
at 739 (1997); Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186. FWSs conduct
therefore amounted to a “constructive denial” of the ITP. R. at 9;
see Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
The District Court correctly held that if procedures to acquire
a permit are so burdensome to effectively deprive plaintiffs of property rights, pursuing a permit is unnecessary. R. at 9 (citing Hage,
35 Fed. Cl. at 164). Requiring Cordelia to replace the lupine field
with contiguous acreage is not only burdensome but also impossible because that acreage exists on land she does not own whose
owner refuses to have restrictions on her property. R. at 6; see
Hage, 35. Fed. Cl. at 164. Moreover, the cost of preparing the permit would be more than the value of the property, with the outcome
still resulting in a denial. R. at 6, 7. Therefore, this Court should
find the issues ripe for review.
B. An ITP Application would be Futile Where the
Permit Necessarily Includes Conditions
Impossible for Cordelia to Satisfy
Landowners must pursue avenues to provide relief but they
are not required to take “patently fruitless measures,” and here,
an ITP application would be futile. MacDonald Sommer & Frates,
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477 U.S. at 359; Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1501
(1990) (Holding that the futility exception excuses property owners
from resubmitting proposals to arrive at a final administrative decision); Macdonald, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7. Further steps towards the
ITP will not change whether FWS issues the permit or not, thereby
making any attempts futile. R. at 9; see Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d
at 1501; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1014, n. 3. (1992) (noting that a permit would not be issued, application or no application). Unlike in Robbins, where a permit was
not sought and the cost was unknown, the cost of mitigation here
is ascertained to be “economically impractical,” and the conditions
precedent are deemed impossible to satisfy. R. at 9; 40 Fed.Cl. at
388.
Here, the regulatory taking challenge is ripe because the unequivocal nature of the regulations that prohibited Cordelia from
developing a residence on her property would make an ITP application meaningless and akin to a permit denial. Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 619; Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169,
1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Robbins, 40 Fed.Cl. at 388. When the permissible uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of
certainty and it is clear that the agency lacks discretion to permit
any development, a takings claim is likely ripe. Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 620. Development of Cordelia’s property would be impermissible as burdened by FWS’s regulation. See id.
Defendant’s cite Morris v. United States, in arguing that Cordelia’s claim is not ripe, however, in that case, the costs of applying
for a permit were not known and the plaintiffs’ takings theory was
not grounded in any agency restriction on the use of their property. R. at 9; Morris v. United States, 392 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). Unlike the present facts, the agency in Morris had not
exercised its discretion in a manner that made reasonably clear or
final the affect the regulation would have on the permit application. 392 F.3d at 1378. The burden on the Cordelia Lot cripples
all economically beneficial use by prohibiting “any disturbance,”
and is ripe for judicial review. R. at 6.
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III. THE RELEVANT PARCEL FOR TAKINGS
ANALYSIS IS THE CORDELIA LOT AND NOT THE
ENTIRETY OF LEAR ISLAND
The legal and factual circumstances in this case dictate that
the relevant parcel for a takings claim is the Cordelia Lot. At the
time of subdivision, King Lear conveyed each of the three lots to
his three daughters by deed, but retained for himself a life interest. R. at 5. Upon the death of King Lear in 2005, individual and
distinct fee simple absolute ownership rights to the three Lear Island lots vested respectively in each of his daughters. Therefore,
the Cordelia Lot was legally severed from the other two Lear Island
lots, precluding a compelled re-aggregation of the estates for the
purposes of a takings analysis.
A. The Death of King James Lear in 2005 Vested a
Distinct Fee Simple Ownership Right in Cordelia
Lear
Cordelia Lear’s estate of fee simple absolute in the Cordelia lot
was vested in her upon the expiration of her father’s life estate in
2005. Prior to 2005, Cordelia held a vested remainder in her respectively deeded lot because a future interest is vested if it is certain to take effect in possession or enjoyment. Restatement (Third)
of Property § 25.3 (Am. Law Inst. 2011). Before subdividing the
Island, King James Lear held a fee simple absolute interest in the
entirety of Lear Island, handed down from the original 1803
grantee, Cornelius Lear. R. at 4, 5. When King Lear subdivided
Lear Island in 1965, he “deeded each of the lots, respectively, to his
three daughters, reserving a life estate in each lot for himself.” R.
at 5 (emphasis added). It was therefore King Lear’s manifest intent that the three lots be held separately, in fee, by his daughters. See id. Thus, when King Lear died in 2005, Cordelia Lear
came into individual possession and ownership of her
lot. Id. Based on common law principles of succession, and without anything in the record to indicate otherwise, it must be assumed that Cordelia acquired a fee simple absolute interest in her
lot when her full rights vested.
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B. The Cordelia Lot Must Be Considered Separately
from the Other Lear Island Lots for Takings
Analysis
Because Cordelia Lear owns a fee simple interest in her tenacre lot, distinct from the fee simple interests of her sisters in the
other two lots, the relevant parcel for the takings claim must be
the Cordelia lot alone. For the purpose of determining whether a
government action constitutes an unconstitutional taking, a court
must consider the “nature and extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole[.]” Penn. Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978). The Supreme
Court has rejected “conceptual severance” arguments designed to
manufacture takings claims. See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331
(2002). However, “conceptual severance” arguments such as that
in Tahoe-Sierra are sometimes advanced for the purpose of attempting to disaggregate some portion of a combined property interest (in Tahoe-Sierra, a temporal disaggregation) as a distinct interest unto itself. Id. Such legal subterfuge, however, is not
required here.
The existence of an estate in fee simple absolute, vested with
the Plaintiff, alleviates the Court’s need to struggle with the “denominator” or “relevant parcel” question in a takings deprivation
analysis due to the fee simple estate’s “rich tradition of protection
at common law.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). Determination of whether a regulatory
taking has occurred requires a comparison between “the value that
has been taken” from a property and “the value that remains.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis 480 U.S.
470, 497 (1987). Thus, in the regulatory takings “fraction,” the
“relevant parcel” furnishes the “denominator,” or the total interest
in property against which the deprivation of value or use is measured. See id. Cordelia Lear’s interest in her lot is hers alone, and
she holds no interest in the lots of her sisters. The severance of
interest in the Cordelia Lot was manifested in fact by the subdivision of the Island in 1965, before the existence of the regulatory
burden, and a formal subdivision of land creates a new group of
smaller “denominators” out of the larger pre-subdivision “parcel as
a whole.” See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d
1171, 1181 (Fed.Cir. 1994) (holding that lands transferred before
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the creation of the re environment should not be included in the
denominator).
C. Brittain County’s Claim that the Relevant Parcel
is the Entire Island Runs Contrary to Prior
County Action
Evidently Defendant Brittain County was aware of and approved the division of Lear Island into separate lots. In 1965, the
Brittain Town Planning Board approved the subdivision of Lear
Island, and determined that each lot could be developed with at
least one single family home. R. at 5. The subdivision approval
and zoning determination occurred before King Lear executed the
three deeds to his daughters. Id. Thus, King Lear could just as
easily have conveyed any or all of the three lots to complete
strangers if he had so chosen. Had that been the case, it is doubtful
that Brittain County or FWS would attempt to claim, as they do
now, a subsequent re-merging of interests with respect to the three
lots.
IV. NO ECONOMICALLY BENEFICIAL USE
REMAINS IN THE CORDELIA LOT,
CONSTITUTING A PERMANENT TAKING
REQUIRING COMPENSATION
The Supreme Court is clear that when a property owner is
made to sacrifice “all economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good” a taking has occurred. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019
(emphasis in original). Furthermore, the only appropriate remedy
to the occurrence of a taking is through compensation. First English Evangelical Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987). The Wetlands Law and the designation of
the entire Cordelia Lot as critical habitat deny Plaintiff any opportunity for development. R. at 6-7. As the regulations stand, the
Cordelia Lot has no present or future economically beneficial use
and the Plaintiff must be compensated. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S.
at 330 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019).
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A. A Categorical Taking Accrued When the County
Denied the ADP and FWS Constructively Denied
Development on the Cordelia Lot
The Fifth Amendment protects property owners from government invasion by preventing private property from being “taken
for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend.
V. When such an effect is accomplished through regulations that
“wipe out” any remaining economic use of a property, the regulation is considered to be a per se taking. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 101618. It has been repeatedly held that when a regulatory takings
claim arises from the denial of a permit, the appropriate analysis
of a takings claim is at the time of the denial. See United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1171-73 (Fed.
App. Ct. 1991) (holding that a taking occurs when economic development is prevented).
In the present case, the County denial and FWS action
through issuance of the May 15, 2012 letter prevent all development or use of the Cordelia Lot. R. at 6; Whitney, 926 F.2d at 117173. Subsequent events that occur after the fact – if they occur at
all – do not change the interests that were taken from an owner at
the time a regulation takes effect. Whitney, 926 F.2d at 117273. Put another way, determining whether the denial effectuated
a categorical taking depends “only on the effect of that particular
denial on plaintiffs’ property interests at the time of the denial.” Resource Investments, Inc., and Land Recovery, Inc. v.
United States, 85 Fed.Cl. 447, 484 (2009) (emphasis in original).
A takings claim that may be cut short, whether by consequence of legislative amendment or otherwise, does not have the
effect of diminishing what was initially taken. See Tahoe-Sierra,
535 U.S. at 327-28. The Tahoe-Sierra Court in fact quoted Justice
Brennan that “the government must pay just compensation for the
period commencing on the date which the regulation first effected
a ‘taking,’” which was later endorsed in First English. Id. at 328
(quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 658
(1981)). Put simply, “the valuation of property which has been
taken must be calculated as of the time of the taking.” First English, 482 U.S. at 320.
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Here, Defendants advance a position based on the hypothetical
extinction of the species which the FWS regulations seek to protect. R. at 7. It is improper for a court to look beyond acts of certainty and instead rely only on mere possibility when determining
the value of what was taken. See First English, 482 U.S. at 320;
Board of County Supervisors of Prince William County, VA v.
United States, 276 F.3d at 1359, 1365 (2002) (noting any consideration of proposed land uses must be identifiable and be probable to
occur in the “reasonably near future.”) (emphasis added). Thus,
any decision regarding Cordelia’s categorical taking must look directly at the loss she suffered at the time, and not towards speculation. See United States ex rel and for Use of Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 276 (1943) (finding in condemnation suit that future land use cannot be “too remote and speculative to have any legitimate effect upon the valuation.”).
B. No Present or Future Economically Beneficial Use
Remains in the Cordelia Lot
The majority in Tahoe-Sierra emphasized that application of
the categorical takings rule is still appropriate when there is a total taking of the parcel as a whole. 535 U.S. at 329-32. There, the
Court excluded from categorical treatment only properties in
which a landowner retained some economically beneficial use in
the future. Id. Thus, whether a permit denial constitutes a categorical taking of the parcel as a whole turns on future economically
viable use in the parcel as a whole. Id.
The landowners in Tahoe-Sierra never faced a permanent restriction from the 32-month moratorium in contention. Id. at
306. From the beginning the restriction was temporary, with a
start date and – although unspecified at the outset – a finite end
to the development prohibition. Id. Accordingly, the Court found
the landowners had been deprived economic use of their property
for only a finite and temporary period of time, and therefore retained a future interest. Id. at 311. Although the future interests
were diminished in value, they nevertheless remained intact,
which the Court found dispositive in finding no taking of the parcel
as a whole. Id. at 317 n.13.
Unlike Tahoe-Sierra, the regulations imposed on the Cordelia
lot restrict all economically beneficial use of the parcel as a whole,
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not merely a temporal segment. 535 U.S. at 332. Here, like in Lucas, the restrictions on the Cordelia Lot do not include a termination date or a condition upon which the ability to develop would be
reinstated. 505 U.S. at 1010-11. Defendants argue that a hypothetical future in which the Cordelia Lot could become developable
leads to the conclusion that Cordelia retains a future economically
beneficial use of the land. As the regulations stand, there is no
other way to read the permit denial than as permanent. See Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1172-73 (holding that taking accrued
when statute was enacted). Only in retrospect could the present
regulations be read as temporary. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at
329-30.
Defendant’s logic would render Lucas and the entire class of
categorical regulatory takings inapplicable to virtually any set of
facts. A regulation, no matter how permanent it may presently
seem, can always be amended or rescinded. See Hendler v. United
States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed.Cir. 1991). All takings are in fact
temporary, whether the interest taken is “a possessory estate for
years or a fee simple acquired through condemnation, or an easement of use by virtue of a regulation.” Id. Moreover, “[n]othing in
the Just Compensation Clause suggests that ‘takings’ must be permanent and irrevocable.” San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting). When a would be permanent taking is cut
short, it does not change what was previously taken. See Seiber v.
United States, 364 F.3d 1356 (Fed.Cir. 2002); Caldwell v. United
States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (noting that whether a
takings claim is temporary or permanent may be unknown when
it accrues).
The Tahoe-Sierra decision was limited in scope to circumstances where an end point was discernable and definite, and cannot be extended to include hypothetical scenarios. See Seiber, 364
F.3d at 1368 (noting that Tahoe-Sierra may only reject a per se
taking for “temporary development moratoria” and not regulations
that are temporary only because they were changed); Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1350-52 (Fed.Cir. 2002)
(noting that Tahoe-Sierra only rejected categorical taking for temporary moratoria). Therefore, the Court should appropriately determine that Plaintiff suffered a loss of all economically beneficial
use of her land based on the presently discernible future. See First
English, 482 U.S. at 320.
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The distinction between temporary and
permanent takings is irrelevant when a
landowner is deprived of all economically
beneficial use of their land

The facts of this case present restrictions that are permanent
by their own text as applied to the Cordelia Lot. See Tahoe-Sierra,
535 U.S. at 329-30. However, even read as temporary there would
be no distinction because Cordelia has no economically beneficial
use remaining. First English, 482 U.S. at 318. Nowhere in the
Takings Clause is there a distinction between permanent takings
and temporary takings; indeed, First English upholds that “temporary takings which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which
the constitution clearly requires compensation.” 482 U.S. at 318.
Furthermore, the effect of a regulatory taking that deprives an
owner of all use is “the equivalent of a physical appropriation,” for
which the only remedy is just compensation. Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1017. The only appropriate calculation in the present case is to
determine just compensation owed for the complete deprivation of
Cordelia’s property, and the simple prospect of the restrictions being lifted in the future cannot factor into the Court’s decision. See
First English, 482 U.S. at 318-20.
V.

ECONOMIC USE IS THE APPROPRIATE TEST,
AND A TOKEN RETENTION OF VALUE OR
REVENUE RESULTING IN ECONOMIC LOSS
DOES NOT RENDER CATEGORICAL
TREATMENT INAPPOSITE

A property owner left without any economically viable use of
their land has been subjected to a loss analogous to that of a physical taking, constituting a per se categorical taking. Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1017 (citing San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 652 (dissenting
opinion)). ”[F]or what is the land but the profits thereof[?]” Id.
(citing E. Coke, Institutes, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. Ed. 1812). A lack of
beneficial economic use, not whether any land value or revenue
source remains, determines categorical treatment. Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1015; see also Palm Beach Isles Associates v. United States,
231 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed.Cir. 2000); Florida Rock Industries, Inc.
v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 895-97 (Fed.Cir. 1986).
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A. Economic Use is the Determinative Factor for a
Categorical Takings Claim
The majority opinion of the Lucas court articulated that uses
of the land were critical in the analysis of categorical regulatory
takings. 505 U.S. at 1019. Prior history of takings litigation shows
“an abiding concern for the productive use of, and economic investment in, land.” Id. at n.8. In fact, the Court in Lucas focuses their
inquiry on the remaining economically viable use of the property
without ever requiring that the land be truly valueless. See id. at
1026-28. The Court reiterates that physical appropriations, no
matter how insignificant or how great the public interest, must be
justly compensated. Id. at 1029 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)). In comparing
land rendered useless through regulation to that of a physical appropriation, Lucas stated “[w]e believe similar treatment must be
accorded confiscatory regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all
economically beneficial use of land.” Id. at 1029 (emphasis added).
Similar analysis in the Federal Circuit affirms the proposition
that a lack of economically beneficial use is the crux of a categorical
takings claim. See Palm Beach, 231 F.3d at 1365. In Palm Beach,
the plaintiff asserted a categorical takings claim based on denial of
a wetlands permit. Id. at 1364. The Court discussed the analysis
of this type of claim as requiring “sufficient denial of economically
viable use,” reasoning that when an owner is left with no rights
“except bare legal title” the government must pay for the property
interest taken. Id. at 1363. The appropriate inquiry in the present
case is therefore whether Cordelia was deprived of economically
beneficial use of the property. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
After being denied the necessary permits to alter her property
in any way, Cordelia possesses nothing more than empty title to a
piece of land. R. at 6. The combined restrictions effectively confiscate the land from Cordelia, placing it on equal footing with that of
a physical appropriation. See id. at 1029; R. at 6 (FWS May 15,
2016 letter confirming that “any disturbance” to Cordelia’s property aside from annual mowing “would constitute a ‘take’ of the
Karner Blues.”).
In contrast to the application of economically beneficial use in
categorical takings is the finding of a reduction in value. When a
future economically beneficial use remains intact such as that of a
temporary moratorium set to expire, only a diminution in value
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has occurred, and not a denial of all economically beneficial
use. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 317. Thus, the proper reading
of Tahoe-Sierra limits the Court’s holding to whether the value of
future economically beneficial use, if any exists, can be considered
when evaluating a categorical takings claim. See id. The Court
unsurprisingly found a future interest existed, and therefore categorical treatment was inappropriate. Id. at 330-32. However, Tahoe-Sierra affirmed the application of Lucas to instances when “no
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.” Id.
at 330 (emphasis in original). As applied to the restrictions on the
Cordelia Lot, it would be a mischaracterization of Tahoe-Sierra to
use a ‘no remaining value’ standard rather than ‘no remaining beneficial use.’ Id. 329-32.
B. Courts Cannot Use Token Interests Remaining in
Land or Nominal Revenue Resulting in a Net Loss
to Avoid the Duty to Compensate
Although value remains an important part of the calculation
in takings claims, its usefulness is only in determining the amount
of compensation to be paid. Palm Beach, 231 F.3d at 136364. Property does not need to be rendered valueless in order to
proceed with a categorical takings claim. Resources Investments
Inc., 85 Fed.Cl. at 488; see Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631. Courts have
rejected assertions that merely because a property retains a token
interest – as all property arguably does to some degree – categorical treatment is no longer an available option. See Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1044; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631. FWS and the County cannot
escape the requirement to provide just compensation in reliance on
remaining value in the land itself, regardless of the form, so long
as there is no economically beneficial use that remains. Palazzolo,
533 U.S. at 631.
Reliance on Brittain County Butterfly Society’s offer of payment to assert an economically beneficial use exists is unfounded
and misleading at best. In the strictest sense, a yearly revenue of
$1,000 is economic in nature, however Defendant’s misrepresent
judicial interpretation of economically beneficial use. It is true
that economically beneficial use does not mean only an ideal use,
or the most profitable use. See id. at 632. For example, Palazzolo
found a landowner that retained the ability to construct a substantial residence was not deprived of all economically beneficial use,

23

2017]

BEST BRIEF: CORDELIA LEAR

161

despite aspirations to develop on a much larger scale. Id. at
631. However, when a proposed land use that generates revenue
actually results in an overall net loss, the use cannot be economically beneficial. Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed.Cl. 37, 48-49
(1994) (finding that allegedly profitable uses incapable of paying
property taxes are not economically viable).
In the present case, the mere existence of an offer does not justify finding a per se economically beneficial use. Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that takings jurisprudence “is characterized by ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries’” designed to
carefully examine the relevant circumstances. Tahoe-Sierra, 535
U.S. at 322 (quoting Penn. Central, 438 U.S. at 124). Examining
the circumstances of this case elucidates the incongruity of Defendant’s assertion with logic; namely that an offer amounting to less
than the property tax constitutes economic value. See Bowles, 31
Fed.Cl. at 48-49; R. at 7. At the bare minimum, without even covering the property taxes of the Cordelia Lot the Brittain County
Butterfly Society’s offer does not reject Cordelia’s categorical takings claim. Bowles, 31 Fed.Cl. at 48-49.
Furthermore, no other economically beneficial uses have been
identified – a burden that falls on the Defendants. Resources Investments, 85 Fed.Cl. at 490. Any proposed uses must show a reasonable probability that “the land [is] both physically adaptable for
such use and that there is a need or demand for such use in the
reasonably near future.” Board of Cty. Supervisors of Prince William Cty. VA, 276 F.3d at 1365. Nothing in the record suggests
any viable uses for the Cordelia Lot exist. R. at 7. To the contrary,
FWS has informed Cordelia that “any disturbance” whatsoever to
the entire ten acres would constitute a “take” in violation of the
ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (a)(1)(B). Consequently, Cordelia’s takings
claim based on a complete deprivation of economic use is not precluded.
VI. PUBLIC TRUST PRINCIPLES DO NOT
PRECLUDE CORDELIA LEAR’S TAKINGS CLAIM
The public trust doctrine does not impede Cordelia’s takings
claim because it does not apply to lands granted by Congress prior
to a state’s admission to the Union. The public trust doctrine limits private uses of lands beneath navigable waterways held by the
sovereign states. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
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436-37 (1892). However, in 1803 the U.S. Federal Government
granted the fee simple interest in Lear Island and the surrounding
submerged lands to the Lear family, predating statehood and nullifying any State or County public trust authority over the submerged lands of the Lear Island grant. Without authority under a
public trust theory, Brittain County must compensate Cordelia for
depriving her of the use of her property.
A. The Lear Island Grant Is Not Subject to the Public
Trust Doctrine Because It is Not Under the
Sovereign Authority of New Union
1.

Sovereignty is the fundamental basis of the
public trust doctrine

The right of the states to regulate submerged lands under the
public trust doctrine flows from the transfer of sovereignty to state
governments from their predecessor sovereign. In their 1842 decision in Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, the Supreme Court established
for the original thirteen states an “absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them.” 41 U.S. 367, 410
(1842). The Court in Martin traced this sovereign right to “principles of national law,” whereby sovereigns of all nations have presumptive authority to control or dispose of lands in their possession. Id.at 393. In the treaty concluding the Revolutionary War,
the King of England ceded his sovereignty over the Thirteen Colonies to the new United States government. Id. at 394. The colonies became states, and the states assumed the role of sovereign
over their respective lands2, subject only to such rights as were
constitutionally
surrendered
to
the
Federal
Government. Id. at 410.
When the United States acquired new territories, the Federal
Government assumed “the entire dominion and sovereignty” over
those lands “so long as they remain[ed] in a territorial condition.” Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1892). As new states were
organized and admitted to the Union, each new state succeeded the
2. The sovereignty of state governments is delegated to them by their citizens
through the political process, thus any reference to state sovereignty incorporates
the collective sovereignty of “the People” as established in the U.S. Constitution.
See U.S. Const. preamble.
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U.S. as sovereign over lands held in trust for the public within
state borders, putting new states on “equal footing” with the original thirteen as coequal sovereigns. See id. at 49; 57-58. Thus,
when a portion of the Northwest Territory was organized as the
State of New Union, the U.S. Government conferred sovereign
rights on the State along with title to public lands therein, to hold
in trust for the benefit of the public.
2.

The predecessor sovereign’s grant of Lear
Island and its submerged lands precludes the
successor sovereign’s claim of public trust
authority

While holding the Territories as sovereign, the U.S. had “the
power to make grants of lands below high water mark of navigable
waters.” Shively, 152 U.S. at 48. In 1953, Congress expressly exempted such grants from the public trust in the Submerged Lands
Act of 1953 (SLA). 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (2012). The SLA defines “lands beneath navigable waters” as all lands within state
borders covered by tidal or nontidal waters. Id. § 1301(a)(1) (describing nontidal waters navigable at the time of admission); id. § 1301(a)(2)
(regarding
tidelands
and
coastal
zones). However, the SLA goes on to specifically exclude from that
designation any submerged lands “lawfully patented and conveyed
by the United States.” Id. § 1301(f). Thus, the sovereign right of
states to control the use and disposition of lands beneath navigable
waters is restricted by any allodial rights granted by the U.S. prior
to statehood; “such rights are not cut off by the subsequent creation
of the state, but remain unimpaired[.]” U.S. v. Holt State Bank,
270 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1926) (collecting cases affirming the Federal
Government’s sovereign right to alienate submerged Territorial
lands prior to a state’s admission to the Union) (emphasis added).
There is no factual or legal basis under a public trust theory to
support Brittain County’s denial of liability for a taking. In 1803,
the United States Congress granted Lear Island and its surrounding submerged lands in fee simple absolute to Cornelius Lear. R.
at 4. At the time, Lear Island and present-day New Union were
part of the Northwest Territory, thus under the sovereign authority of the Federal Government. Id.; see Shively, 152 U.S. at
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48. New Union was eventually admitted as a state3 and was
granted sovereignty over Federal lands under the “equal footing”
doctrine. See Shively, 152 U.S. at 57-58; R. at 4. However, because
the submerged lands of the Grant were granted to Cornelius Lear
before statehood, those lands were not conveyed to New Union
upon admission and are not considered “lands beneath navigable
waters” under the SLA. R. at 4; 43 U.S.C. § 1301(f) (2012). Thus,
the County has no sovereign authority over those lands and cannot
freely regulate them under the public trust doctrine.
B. Without Regulatory Authority Under the Public
Trust Doctrine, Brittain County’s Wetland
Preservation Law Constitutes a Complete
Deprivation of the Beneficial Use of Cordelia
Lear’s Submerged Lands
Cordelia is entitled to the sole use and occupancy of the wetlands between the lateral boundaries of the Cordelia Lot, and deprivation of that use constitutes a taking. Fee title to the Grant was
passed down through generations of the Lear family, resting in
1965 with King James Lear. R. at 5. When King Lear subdivided
the island and deeded the subject property to Cordelia, she acquired an indefeasible vested remainder in the fee simple title to
the Cordelia Lot. Id.; Restatement (First) of Property § 157, cmt.
h (Am Law Inst. 1936).4 Her father’s death in 2005 vested Cordelia
3. The Record does not indicate when New Union was admitted as a state.
This factual omission would be a source of contention if the parties had to argue
the issue of whether the Cove constituted “navigable waters” under a presumption
of New Union’s sovereign public trust authority. The statutory definition of
“lands beneath navigable waters” looks to whether a waterway was navigable at
the time a state enters the Union. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (2012). The past use of
the Cove as a boat landing might spur the Government to argue that those waters
were navigable in fact when New Union was admitted. R. at 5. Without knowing
the date of New Union’s admission or the range of dates during which the Cove
was “historically” used for landing, it would be difficult to construct a timeline
either supporting or debunking such an argument. Fortunately, the Court is relieved of the need to adjudicate that issue, as the record furnishes other facts with
enough specificity to render the Government’s public trust theory moot, as discussed supra. p. 28.
4. Comment h in the Restatement (First) of Property reads in relevant part:
“When an otherwise effective conveyance [in this case, the Cordelia Lot deed as
conveyed to Cordelia in 1965] of. . .land. . .creates one or more prior interests
[King James Lear’s reserved life estate],. . .and provides. . .that upon the expiration of such prior limited interest [the 2005 death of King Lear], the ownership in
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with full title to her lot in fee simple absolute. Because the subdivision of the island did not include the deeded submerged lands,
and because the record does not indicate that King Lear disposed
of the entire submerged lands of the Grant in a will or other devise,
we must assume that Cordelia inherited an equal share of any intestate submerged lands as a tenant in common with her sisters. 26B C.J.S. Descent and Distribution § 36 (collecting cases
holding that the property of an unmarried intestate descends to his
or her children in equal shares); Cahaba Forests, LLC v. Hay, 927
F.Supp.2d 1273, 1281 (M.D. Ala. 2013) (extending the Alabama Supreme Court’s holding that heirs of an intestate become tenants in
common with undivided interests).
However, her riparian right to use and occupy submerged
lands is limited to the portion that abuts her littoral estate. See
Houston v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 569 F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1978)
(holding that riparian rights of a littoral landowner extend laterally only to the property line of the adjacent littoral landowner). Thus, even if Cordelia may be presumed to hold an undivided one-third ownership interest in the intestate submerged
lands, her beneficial use of any submerged lands is limited to the
Cove.
VII. FWS AND BRITTAIN COUNTY ARE JOINTLY
LIABLE FOR A TOTAL TAKING BECAUSE THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT DEMANDS
COMPENSATION FOR THE COMPLETE
DEPRIVATION OF PLAINTIFF’S PROPERTY
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the uncompensated taking of
private property by the U.S. Government, while the Fourteenth
Amendment extends that prohibition to the states. U.S. Const.
amend. V, XIV § 1; e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702, 713 (2010)
(holding that the Takings Clause – as applied against the states –
prohibits the states from taking either riparian rights or real property without just compensation). Thus, the federal and state governments – and by extension, counties – are mutually obliged by
fee simple absolute of the land. . .shall belong to a person who is presently identifiable [Cordelia Lear, as named on the deed of 1965], such person has an indefeasibly vested remainder.”
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Constitutional mandate to compensate private landowners for takings, and the Federal Courts must check any governmental dereliction of that obligation.
A. Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence Has
Consistently Upheld the Fifth Amendment
Prohibition on Uncompensated Deprivation of
Property Rights
Regulatory takings case law reflects a commitment to effectuate judicial standards consistent with Constitutional protections of
private property rights. The U.S. Supreme Court first enunciated
the regulatory takings doctrine in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Governments may regulate private
property to a certain point without compensation, but if regulation
goes “too far,” it is recognized as a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Id. Thus, if a state or local government exercises its police
power to regulate private property, or if the Federal Government
imposes restrictions on property through a proper exercise of its
Commerce power, the Fifth Amendment and Due Process Clause
require that such regulation does not result in the destruction of
the landowner’s Constitutional rights. See id. at 413-14.
The Takings Clause bars governments from “forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at
617-18 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 36 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)
(holding that a “fair interpretation” of the Takings Clause requires
compensation of landowners for losses when the inverse benefits of
those losses accrue to the public)). The principles of “fairness” and
“justice,” though not expressly in the Fifth Amendment, are the
governing policy standards for judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause.
B. Losses Incurred by Private Landowners Are the
Fundamental Consideration in Determining Fifth
Amendment Liability
Regulatory takings analysis centers squarely on the private
landowner’s losses and deprivation of rights in their property. Even where the Supreme Court has held that a regulatory
taking did not occur, that conclusion relies on an assessment of the
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degree to which the value of the ownership interest is diminished. Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 419. In the words of Justice William
O. Douglas, “[i]t is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain, which is
the measure of the value of the property taken.” U.S. v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946). The Supreme Court’s Keystone Bituminous test for regulatory takings compares “the value that has been
taken” and “the value that remains.” 480 U.S. at 497. Thus, in the
regulatory takings “fraction,” wherein the “relevant parcel” furnishes the “denominator,” the degree to which the owner’s property
rights are infringed supplies the “numerator.” Id. Put another
way, the landowner’s loss – and destruction of the right to enjoy
and use the land – is the determinative value in the analysis. See
id. Whether a taking has occurred has nothing to do with the social value of the regulatory mechanisms by which that loss is imposed. See id.
Regulations will result in a compensable taking if they categorically deny a landowner’s use of her land, regardless of any public benefits that may accrue from regulations, or the public nuisances or harms that the regulations may prevent. See Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1026. As Justice Scalia points out, the distinction between
compensable takings and mere deprivations not requiring compensation would be “difficult, if not impossible to discern” if based on
the government’s justifications for regulation rather than losses incurred in fact by the landowner. Id. Such losses are the only
measurable indicia by which a deprivation of property interests
can be consistently evaluated from case to case. Id. Thus, the calculation for determining whether a total regulatory taking has occurred is decidedly landowner-centric.
C. Faithful Application of Established Fifth
Amendment and Regulatory Takings Precedent
Compels a Finding of Joint FWS and County
Liability
When adjudicating a regulatory takings claim, the courts must
first determine if a property owner has been left without economically viable use of the property. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017. Courts
will only proceed to the next element of the applicable test when it
has been decided whether the loss incurred by the landowner as a
result of the land use restrictions constitutes either a Lucas per se

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelroc/vol8/iss1/5

30

168 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 8

categorical taking or a Penn. Central partial regulatory taking. See Palm Beach, 231 F.3d at 1363-64. If a Penn. Central partial taking is found to have accrued, a court will next consider “the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.” 438 U.S. at 124. However, if the land
use restrictions are found to deny the landowner all economically
viable use of the property, a Lucas categorical taking has occurred,
and at that point the nature of the land use restrictions may be
considered as part of the calculus to fix the extent of monetary
damages. Palm Beach, 231 F.3d at 1363. Upon a finding of a total
regulatory taking, the issue of investment-backed expectations becomes moot, and “both law and sound constitutional policy entitle
the owner to just compensation.” Id. at 1364 (emphasis added). In
other words, the causes of a total loss will only be examined after
it is found that a loss has occurred. By that point, because the loss
has occurred, the landowner is entitled to just compensation regardless of which or how many agencies have caused the loss. The
Fifth Amendment expressly prohibits uncompensated takings; it
does not limit the range of potentially liable takers.
In the present case, the Federal regulation prohibiting disturbance of the Karner Blue’s habitat and the County Wetlands
Preservation Law prohibiting development of the Cove combine to
deprive Cordelia Lear of all economically beneficial use of both the
ten-acre Cordelia Lot and the developable riparian lands in which
Cordelia owns a right of use and occupancy. See R. at 6, 7. Because the restrictions completely deprive Cordelia of the beneficial
use of her property, a categorical taking has occurred. Lucas, 505
U.S. at 1026. The next step in a categorical takings analysis is to
determine the monetary damages sufficient to meet the Fifth
Amendment mandate of just compensation.5 Palm Beach, 231
F.3d at 1363. The amount of compensation is measured by the
property’s fair market value, although the nature of the use restrictions may be considered as a factor in determining government
liability. Id. However, because the restrictions in this case create

5. An assessment of the owner’s expectations regarding future use would
only be relevant in determining what portion of the property had been encumbered by the restrictions if a partial taking were found to have been imposed.
Palm Beach, 231 F.2d at 1363-64. Because Cordelia has suffered a categorical
taking, any argument based on the applicability of a Penn. Central partial regulatory takings test must fail.

31

2017]

BEST BRIEF: CORDELIA LEAR

169

a blanket prohibition on any development or other economically viable use, Cordelia is entitled to the fair market value of her property.
A review of federal Fifth Amendment case law yields no precedent barring the joint liability of a federal and county agency for
a total regulatory taking. Neither does it unearth any precedent
to the contrary. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide
unequivocally for just compensation when private property is
taken by the Federal and State Governments. U.S. Const. amend.
V, XIV § 1; e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617. The states, in turn,
delegate their police power to local governments, typically by way
of legislative grant. 1 Local Govt. Law § 2:6. Accordingly, FWS
and Brittain County share a mutual obligation to abide by the limits on government power specified in the U.S. Bill of Rights. Citizens of the County, as citizens of the State, are also citizens of the
United States, and therefore equally protected under the Fifth
Amendment from uncompensated takings on the part of any government agency: federal, state, and local. U.S. Const. amend. XIV
§1. Citizen rights, and the government obligation to protect them,
operate at all levels of the federalist system.
This case presents a unique opportunity for this Court to set a
precedent that establishes a common law protection of Fifth
Amendment rights against aggregated regulatory takings. The alternative – to hold that two restrictions that are separate partial
takings do not require compensation despite effectuating in fact a
total taking – would invite potential agency collusion and abuses
of the Fifth Amendment. Such a rule could be interpreted as judicial acquiescence to government windfalls resulting from strategic
regulation by multiple agencies. Hence, in the interests of justice
and fairness, this Court should find FWS and Brittain County
jointly liable for the total taking of Cordelia Lear’s property.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully asks the Court
to reverse the district court’s determination on the following point
and instead find that: ESA protection of an intrastate population
of the Karner Blue butterfly is not a valid exercise of FWSs regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause. Plaintiff further
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asks the court to affirm the district court’s rulings that: (1) Plaintiff’s takings claim is ripe because requiring her to pursue an ITP
would constitute an undue burden; (2) the Cordelia Lot, rather
than the entirety of Lear Island, is the relevant parcel for a takings
analysis; (3) the suggestion that the property may become developable upon the natural destruction of the Karner Blue in ten
years does not bar Plaintiff’s takings claim of a complete deprivation of economic value; (4) the Brittain County Butterfly Society’s
offer to pay $1,000 per year in rent does not preclude Plaintiff’s
taking claim of a complete loss of economic value; (5) public trust
principles do not inhere in Plaintiff’s title because the public trust
does not include lands Congressionally granted before statehood;
and (6) FWS and Brittain County are jointly liable for a complete
deprivation of economic value of the Cordelia Lot under a fair and
just interpretation of the Fifth Amendment.
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